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No Employment without Participation: An Evaluation of India's 
Employment Program in Eastern Uttar Pradesh 
 
 
 
Kartik Misra1 
 
Abstract 
 
The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) provides 100 days of 
employment in a year to every rural household at the legal minimum wage. At the national level this 
programme has been highly successful in providing an income safety-net to small peasants and landless 
workers. However, in the poorer states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Jharkhand the provision of public 
employment under NREGA has been inadequate. Using evidence from field research in the Mirzapur 
district of Uttar Pradesh, this paper aims to study how awareness among programme beneficiaries about 
their legal entitlements and at various levels of government determines the provision of NREGA 
employment in one of the poorest regions of the country. Further, we discuss the impact of NREGA on 
agricultural productivity and wage bargaining by landless workers who are the intended beneficiaries of 
NREGA. Our findings suggest that patron-client exchanges between the local elite and NREGA 
beneficiaries determines the provision of public employment and generates rents for the local elite. 
Therefore, there is urgent need for increasing transparency in NREGA provision and creating mechanisms 
to hold elected representatives and government functionaries accountable to NREGA beneficiaries.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) is the largest rural 
welfare program in the world. Enacted in India in 2005, this scheme guarantees 100 days of 
employment in a year to every rural household at the legal minimum wage. The Act was 
operational in the 200 poorest districts by February 2006, another 130 districts got the scheme in 
the second phase in April 2007 and finally by 2008, the entire country was under its ambit. This 
legal work entitlement impacts close to 50 million households in India and is thus a powerful tool 
for social and economic transformation. Through its joint emphasis on social protection and 
livelihood security, the scheme endeavours to empower the rural poor by instilling a new sense of 
identity and bargaining power and make economic growth inclusive for all in rural India. However, 
lack of transparency in its implementation and awareness of legal entitlements of workers has 
diluted the demand-driven nature of the program. Using primary data collected from the Halia 
block of Mirzapur district in Uttar Pradesh, this paper documents the extent of awareness of legal 
entitlements by program beneficiaries and government officials responsible for its implementation 
in one of the poorest regions of the country. Further, we discuss the impact of NREGA on 
agricultural productivity and wage bargaining by landless workers who are the intended 
beneficiaries of NREGA. Our study suggests that patron-client exchanges between the local elite 
and NREGA beneficiaries determines the provision of public employment and generates rents for 
the local elite.  
Public workfare programs have enjoyed a long and distinguished presence in the experience of 
economic development around the world and their potential benefits depend on their ability to 
create income safety-nets for the poor.2 This program improves upon earlier employment schemes 
in two ways. First, it employs workers directly and prohibits the hiring of private contractors as 
there is a long history of private contractors exploiting workers through underpayment and other 
forms of harassment (Ambasta et al., 2008). Second, public works under NREGA do not use labour 
displacing technology in order to maximize employment generation under NREGA. NREGA is a 
demand driven program based on the principle of self-selection (Dutta et al., 2012). It treats 
employment as a legal right and if the state is unable to provide employment for participants then 
                                                     
2 India has a long history with these programs since the 1960s. Schemes like Jawahar Rozgar Yojana, Employment Assurance 
Scheme, Food for Work Program, Jawahar Gram Samridhi Yojana, and Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojana were forerunners to 
NREGA. Subbarao (1997) provides an overview of India’s employment guarantee programs.  
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it is obliged to pay workers without work. Public employment generated through NREGA is meant 
to generate productive assets that increase agricultural productivity and provide livelihood 
security. These include works aimed at natural resource management like irrigation works and 
afforestation. Moreover, public works can also be aimed to specifically improve the productivity 
of agricultural land owned by the scheduled castes, scheduled tribes and other disadvantaged 
sections of society. Finally, labour can also be employed to build rural infrastructure like toilets, 
roads and food grain storage structures (Dreze et al., 2006). 
In 2018, NREGA completed a decade of being in operation throughout the country. Several 
academic studies and newspaper editorials were written to analyse each aspect of this historic 
legislation. Evidence suggests that public works leading to capital formation in agriculture have 
three potential effects on welfare (i) The direct effect of job creation for those employed (Klonner 
and Oldiges, 2014), (ii) public employment in the lean season of agriculture raise wages (Azam, 
2011); and (iii) creation of public goods which increase agricultural productivity (Berg et al., 
2012). There is evidence that NREGA has increased agricultural wages by around 4.3 percent 
(Berg et al., 2018) which caused a 20-percentage point shift away from use of labour-intensive 
technologies by small farmers (Bhargava, 2014) and resulted in crowing-out of private agricultural 
labour by 5 percentage points in regions where NREGA employment is not rationed (Misra, 2019). 
Additionally, Imbert and Papp (2015) show that the increase in wages for households in the poorest 
30 percent of the population accounts for around 31 percent of the total welfare gains from the 
program. Correspondingly, others have argued that public works under NREGA contributed to 
increasing the productivity of agriculture which contributed to the non-transfer benefits of the 
programme (Deininger and Liu, 2013; Abreu et al., 2014). 
In practice, NREGA suffers from several problems like reduced budgetary allocation, corruption, 
violation of people's entitlements and insufficient employment generation (Aggarwal, 2016). 
Further, the implementation and performance of NREGA varies considerably across states and 
districts. While states like Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, 
Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu have successfully created more than 100 days of employment under 
the program (Imbert and Papp, 2015), other states like Jharkhand and Bihar have lagged in the 
provision of NREGA employment under the program (Dutta et al., 2012; Bhatia and Dreze, 2006). 
Existing studies have identified limited administrative capacities, low awareness of the program 
among beneficiaries (Ravallion et al., 2015), insufficient financial allocation for NREGA 
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(Banerjee and Saha, 2010), and corruption by bureaucrats (Adhikari and Bhatia, 2010) and private 
contractors (Bhagat, 2012) to explain poor performance of the program in certain states. Misra 
(2019) finds that local political economy factors like historical inequality in landownership and 
concentration of political power determines the provision of NREGA employment and its labour 
market impact.  
In the state of Uttar Pradesh (UP), existing literature documents that the provision of NREGA has 
been inadequate. Dutta et al., (2012) show that in 2009-10 over 54 percent of the households in 
UP that demanded work under NREGA were not provided public employment guaranteed under 
the Act. Paradoxically, the same study found that the demand for NREGA work in UP is also low. 
Only around 35 percent of rural households officially demanded employment under NREGA when 
the national average was around 45 percent. This is surprising since UP has the highest proportion 
of the population below the poverty line in comparison to any state in the country. This lack of 
demand for NREGA suggests that workers may not be fully aware of their rights to demand public 
employment which is NREGA's unique feature. 
National level studies on the functioning of NREGA conceals considerable regional heterogeneity 
in the implementation of the programme and few field-based studies have focussed on local 
political economy factors in the provision of NREGA, particularly in eastern Uttar Pradesh. This 
research aims to fill this lacuna in the existing literature. This paper aims to study how awareness 
among beneficiaries about their legal entitlements and at various levels of government determine 
the functioning of NREGA in one of the poorest regions of the country where NREGA has been 
operational since its inception in 2006. High incidence of poverty, prevalence of bonded labour in 
agriculture and high Maoist insurgency, were the main motivations in choosing the Halia block of 
Mirzapur district in Uttar Pradesh (UP) as the main setting for this study. We conducted in-depth 
household level surveys with NREGA beneficiaries and semi-structured interviews with 
government officials in 12 Gram Panchayats of Halia block. 
This study contributes to the existing literature on the functioning of NREGA in three critical ways. 
First, this paper is the first to interview government officials at the state, district and block-level 
responsible for the planning and implementation of the scheme to understand the bottlenecks in 
NREGA implementation on the supply side.  Using semi-structured interviews from government 
functionaries, this paper discusses how and why the actual execution of NREGA diverges 
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significantly from the provisions of the Act. This allows us to understand various processes 
associated with the program based on information on the flow of finances, data entry processes 
and the role of block and district level development officers in supporting the endeavours of the 
Gram Panchayats.  
Second, using primary household level data, we analyse bottlenecks on the demand side by 
recording people's perceptions about NREGA implementation and the role of various stakeholders 
to assess their awareness of various provisions of the Act. Finally, this paper analyses the impact 
of NREGA on agricultural production, and labour supply of NREGA beneficiaries in the region to 
ascertain whether NREGA income allows farmers to change their production decisions.  
There are four major findings from this study. On the supply side, first, our findings suggest that 
even though NREGA has been India’s flagship poverty alleviation program for more than a 
decade, government functionaries at the state and local level have little awareness of their 
responsibilities and administrative capacity to ensure smooth functioning of NREGA at the grass-
roots level. Additionally, official records of the number of employment days created, wages paid 
under the programme differ significantly from those reported by workers. Second, in the surveyed 
villages all decision-making authority was concentrated with the elected head of the village 
assembly (Pradhan). This concentration of power creates patron-client relationships of exchange 
between the Pradhan and workers which generates rents for the former and safeguards his class 
interests.  
On the demand side, we find that first, around 60 percent of NREGA workers in our sample were 
not aware of the provisions of the scheme and their role in demanding employment under NREGA 
and participating in its implementation and planning at the local level. Further, contrary to 
evidence from states like Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh where workers’ participation and social 
audits create transparency and predictability in NREGA implementation, our surveys find that 
citizens are excluded from the planning process and the role of the village assembly is totally 
irrelevant in the provision of NREGA. Second, the provision of NREGA in this region is not 
enough to increase agricultural productivity and consequently, its impact on agricultural wage 
bargaining is limited. This is contrary to national level analysis which finds that NREGA has a 
positive impact on agricultural productivity and wages (Berg et al., 2012; Berg et al., 2018). This 
difference is caused primarily by the erratic and unpredictable nature of NREGA employment in 
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Mirzapur has not resulted in productive assets being created in the region and consequently, 
NREGA has had no impact on agricultural productivity in this region.  
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the survey region 
and discusses the sampling process and methodology of data collection used in this study. Section 
3 presents the findings of our interviews with government officials and shows how processes 
necessary to increase workers' participation in NREGA functioning are not followed. Section 4 
analyses the findings of our household surveys of NREGA beneficiaries and section 5 reports the 
findings from our focus-group discussions on how NREGA is impacting agricultural productivity 
and labour demand. Section 6 argues that lack of awareness among NREGA beneficiaries serves 
the vital purpose of protecting the interests of the local elite and finally section 7 concludes with 
some policy implications of this study. 
2. CHOICE OF DISTRICT AND DATA COLLECTION 
This study was conducted in the Halia block of Mirzapur district in eastern Uttar Pradesh.3 Lack 
of proper implementation and embezzlement of NREGA funds in the region has attracted 
considerable media attention and has been the subject of a high-level official inquiry (PTI, 2014).4 
In this context, there are two main motivations for documenting the functioning of NREGA in this 
region.  
First, this region is characterized by the presence of the kol community which is one of the most-
backward communities of the country and is forced to work in tied-labour arrangements in 
agriculture. Following the pioneering work of Srinivas and Marriot (1995), several researchers 
have analysed the role of caste identity in determining people's access to public goods, their ability 
to engage profitably in trade and to raise capital through collateral (Banerjee and Somanathan, 
2007; Anderson, 2011; Verma, 1991; Dreze et al., 1999). Rural wages and the incidence of poverty 
differ along gender, caste and religious lines. Social stratification along caste and gender lines can 
reduce certain groups' access to NREGA, who remain impoverished in regions where these 
inequalities are more pronounced. In this context, analysing the kol community become crucial 
given their extreme social and economic exclusion. The second motivation for choosing Halia 
                                                     
3 Blocks or tehsils are administrative sub-division of a district created for rural development. Halia is one of the 12 administrative 
blocks of Mirzapur. 
4 For instance, Singh (2009) records instances of corruption and other problems with NREGA implementation in the region. 
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block was that this region is affected by Maoist movements. While there is some literature which 
examines the impact of NREGA on the Maoists, granular, block level evidence is scarce.  
We conduced informal discussions with several state and district level officials and undertook 
household level surveys of NREGA participants between November 2016 and March 2017. This 
section presents an overview of the survey district and presents our sampling and data collection 
strategy. 
2.1 Mirzapur 
Mirzapur located in the eastern part of Uttar Pradesh (UP), is one of the poorest 200 districts of 
the country and among the fifteen poorest districts of UP (Haq, 2017).5 This district was covered 
under NREGA in the first phase in 2006. It is a predominantly rural district with 86 percent of its 
total population of around 2.5 million residing in rural areas. Over 65 percent of the total labour 
force is employed in agriculture.6  
Selected demographic indicators are given below in Table 1. The proportion of marginalized 
communities, particularly Scheduled Castes is 28 percent in Mirzapur while the state-level average 
is 23 percent. Socially backward communities like SCs and STs are over-represented in NREGA 
participation as the incidence of poverty is higher for these groups.7 Correspondingly we find that 
5 percent of our sample of NREGA beneficiaries comprises of STs, when their share in district-
level population is only 0.7 percent. Further, literacy rates among these groups (56 percent for SCs 
and 57 percent for STs) are also lower than the state average of (60 percent for SCs and 64 percent 
for STs). We next discuss the kol community and the Maoist movements in this region. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
2.1.1 Kols 
In addition to widespread poverty and higher incidence of marginalized communities, Halia district 
is also home to the kol community. The kols are a tribal community of Central India who live 
primarily in the states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and 
Tripura. This community is classified as Scheduled Tribes (ST) in all states except UP where they 
                                                     
5 In the 2003 ranking of districts by poverty, Mirzapur was ranked 180 out of the 447 backward districts of the country (Planning 
Commission, 2005). 
6 This includes the percentage of cultivators and agricultural wage workers. 
7 For instance, in 2011, 45 percent of the Scheduled Tribes living in rural India were below the poverty line in comparison to 
only 15 percent of those belonging to the upper castes. 
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are classified as Scheduled Castes (SC). According to the Census of India, (2011) the total 
population of the community is estimated at 1.7 million, of which around 300 thousand kols live 
in eastern UP.8 
The kols like most tribal adivasi groups of the country, have traditionally depended on forest 
produce for subsistence. The kols of Central India have been among the most disadvantaged groups 
in the country and their development indicators have lagged other tribal communities. For instance, 
in a study of body-mass index (BMI) of adult males in Central India, Adak et al., (2006) find that 
over 51 percent of the kols in the region suffered from severe to mild chronic energy deficiency. 
In the three decades following India's independence in 1947, these groups have been dispossessed 
of their lands and denied access to forests under various developmental paradigms. These groups 
have been displaced and rendered homeless for the construction of large dams and industrial 
townships (Guha, 2007). This process of dispossession of adivasis accelerated under the neoliberal 
policies followed by the Indian state since the 1990s. Verma (2016) shows that till 1990s, 40 
percent of all displaced social groups were adivasis and policies of involuntary land transfer for 
setting-up of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) increased the dispossession of this group 
significantly. Further, this group has suffered violent atrocities and human rights violations by the 
police and other agencies as they organize resistance movements against land grab attempts by the 
state (Baviskar, 2003). 
The kols of southern UP work primarily as wage workers in agriculture and in quarry mining 
industries. Most kol households either do not own agricultural land or own uneven, rocky or less-
productive land.9 They dwell in stone or katchcha houses without basic amenities like electricity, 
clean water, toilets or access to health care (Rashid, 2013). Srinivasan et al., (2005) find that the 
kols of Halia block in Mirzapur are among the few communities where bonded labour in 
agriculture has continued unabated. These tied-labour arrangements among kols represent inter-
linked factor markets characterized by debt-bondage where workers are forced to work for large 
agricultural landlords (often over generations) in order to service a short debt or loan taken from 
their employers. 
                                                     
8 Madhya Pradesh has around 900 thousand kol population which is the highest in the country. 
9 A full account of struggles for kol landownership can be found here. 
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In a detailed study of bonded workers in Halia block of Mirzapur, Shankar (1996) finds that 
workers traditionally take a small loan in order to meet the expenses of a marriage or funeral 
(shradh) and are forced to pledge their labour to the landlord who does not charge interest on the 
loan. Further, workers are paid using food-grains.10 In addition, this labour-tying arrangement also 
involves a component of share cropping. The kol workers are given a small plot of land (0.06 ha) 
for subsistence farming and the landlords claims a share of the produce based on the credit and 
inputs like seeds and fertilizers supplied by them in the production process. 
2.1.2 Maoist movements in the region 
In addition to bonded labour, the Halia block of Mirzapur is also affected by armed left-wing 
Maoist movements by virtue of being situated at the border of Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. 
Socio-economic exclusion and high incidence of poverty has contributed to these struggles in the 
region. Borooah (2008) finds that the probability of a district being affected by extremist 
movements is increasing in poverty and decreasing in literacy. 
While 41 percent of UP's population is below the poverty-line, Mirzapur has a higher concentration 
of poverty. Using the 2004, National Sample Survey (Consumption Expenditure Survey) we find 
that the poverty rate in Mirzapur is around 53 percent. High levels of poverty coupled with Maoist 
insurgencies has contributed to the listing of the district among 170 extremely backward districts 
and among the 55 extremist affected districts of the country (Planning Commission, 2005).11 While 
there is some evidence of NREGA has succeeded in creating an income safety-net for people and 
improved their participation in anti-Maoist operations (Khanna and Zimmerman, 2017), therefore, 
it is important to assess the impact of the programme in this region as such local level evidence is 
scarce.  
2.2 Sampling and Data Collection 
This paper presents the findings of a field study conducted in the Halia block of Mirzapur district. 
There are two components of the study. First, we document the district and block-level 
administrative processes involved in the provision of NREGA and second, we discuss the gaps in 
                                                     
10 The wages in kind are mostly given in kodo which is an inferior rain-fed crop (Shankar, 1996).  
11 See Kumar et al., (2015) for details of the Maoist movement in eastern Uttar Pradesh. 
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implementation and the extent of awareness workers have of the rights of workers under the 
program. Correspondingly, we collect data from government officials and NREGA beneficiaries. 
2.2.1 Administrative Data Collection 
This paper is the first to document the experiences of officials involved in the ground level 
implementation of NREGA. Between August - November of 2017, we conducted several rounds 
of semi-structured interviews with officials involved in NREGA implementation at the state, 
district and block levels. At the state level, we discussed the role of the state government in the 
implementation of NREGA with officials of the Ministry of Rural Development in the state capital 
of Lucknow. At the district level, we interviewed the office of the Chief Development officer 
(CDO) of Mirzapur to document the procedure of data entry, funds transfer and recording un-met 
demand for NREGA work at the district level. Finally, at the block level we interviewed the office 
of the Block Development Officer (BDO) to assess the administrative capacity at the block level 
for NREGA provision and supervision in the Halia block of Mirzapur. 
2.2.2 Household Survey Data  
In order to understand the impediments to NREGA participation and timely wage payment in one 
of the most backward regions of the country we conduced household level surveys of NREGA 
beneficiaries in 12 Gram Panchayats of Halia block from November 2017 - February 2018. The 
NREGA web portal provides detailed information about NREGA workers at the village level 
including the number of days and names of projects in which NREGA beneficiaries have worked. 
Using the work records for the year 2017 from the NREGA web-portal, we randomly selected 
around 1100 households for our study. Of these, we were able to trace around 973 households who 
were surveyed for this study.12 
Our surveys included both quantitative and qualitative questions about household characteristics 
and assets, indebtedness profiles of household members and their sources of income including 
agricultural and non-agricultural earnings. Further, we asked beneficiaries about their participation 
in and awareness of the provisions of NREGA. These included detailed questions about the number 
                                                     
12 Most villages had a population less than 2,000 people and settlements were organized along caste lines. Therefore, it was easy 
to identify and survey individuals from these households. In many cases we were informed that some individuals on our list had 
migrated out of the village a few years ago or were deceased. The inability of our team to locate around 120 households may 
indicate the presence of fudging of muster-rolls documented in existing studies like Adhikari and Bhatia (2010). However, we are 
unable to ascertain whether these were indeed instances of `ghost-workers' and suggest the need for future research on this issue. 
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of days they worked under NREGA, wages paid and conditions of work. Additionally, we recorded 
people's perceptions and experiences of negotiating with the Pradhans or BDO for their 
entitlements under NREGA. Table 2 provides the break-up of sample households by their caste 
and Gram Panchayat (GP). Fuliyari and Gaurava are the largest GPs in the sample and they 
collectively contribute to around 40 percent of the sample. While, all GPs in the sample are affected 
by Maoist activity, the villages of Fuliyari, Parshiakala, Deohyat, Khutha and Gaurava are right 
at the border of Madhya Pradesh are more prone to insurgent activities. These household level 
surveys were conducted in respondents’ homes, so they feel comfortable in answering questions 
about NREGA wages received and their perceptions about the role of their elected representatives 
and government officials.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
2.2.3 Focus Group Discussions 
In addition, we also conducted two focus group discussions asking people about the impact of 
NREGA on agricultural productivity, incomes and employment opportunities. These focus group 
discussions were held in the villages of Halia and Fuliyari where around 10-15 cultivators and 
agricultural wage workers were asked to discuss whether NREGA was having any spill over 
impact in agriculture. In several villages we were invited by the Pradhan for a meeting to discuss 
the functioning of NREGA and the problems faced by them. However, this would have interfered 
with our findings, so we decided to not meet with the Pradhan’s.13 
2.2.4 Summary Statistics 
We present summary statistics for our sample in Table 3. We see most NREGA beneficiaries were 
below the poverty line and lived in katchcha houses without access to clean drinking water and 
toilets. The respondents of all social groups relied primarily on public distribution of food at 
subsidized rates for rations. Most households had solar energy panels installed on their roofs which 
generally powered one LCD lamp and a mobile charging plug point for around ten hours in a day. 
These solar panels were installed under government programs where beneficiaries had to pay only 
10 percent of the total cost. Further, most households had few durable assets other than bicycle 
                                                     
13 In some cases, the Pradhan’s offered to arrange for surveys to be conducted in his house but we rejected these offers. 
 11 
 
and mobile phones. In most cases, the mobile phones were used primarily by men and women did 
not report owning mobiles. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
3. SUPPLY-SIDE CONSTRAINTS IN NREGA IMPLEMENTATION  
As the survey of existing studies in Section 1 showed, there was surprisingly little awareness about 
NREGA’s provisions and worker entitlements among our respondents. Existing research on the 
implementation of NREGA has focused primarily on improving the transparency of the village 
assemblies (Gram Panchayats) through social audits (Kumar and Shah, 2015) and capacity 
building and greater monitoring (Aiyar and Samji, 2006). Other studies have discussed the role of 
caste and gender affiliations of elected representatives (Johnson, 2009) and funds utilization and 
state-level capacity for proper implementation of NREGA (Chakraborty, 2007). However, few 
studies have focused on the bureaucratic capacity and opaque information flow within the 
administrative set-up created to oversee the provision of NREGA, particularly in the poorer 
states.14  
The implementation of NREGA rests on the coordinated and timely functioning of the state, 
district and local governments. Himanshu (2013) outlines the responsibilities of each of these 
institutions in the planning, provision of public employment and wage payments under the 
program. This scheme is largely financed by the Central government but under Section 32 of the 
NREGA Act, the responsibility of implementing it is vested with state and local government or 
the Gram Panchayats (Mookherjee, 2014). In this section, we discuss that lack of awareness of 
workers' rights and the duties of elected representatives and government functionaries under 
NREGA contributes to the formation of client-patron exchanges between workers and the local 
elite and corruption in the provision of NREGA. We discuss the role played by each level of 
government in Mirzapur district of eastern Uttar Pradesh. 
3.1 Role of the State Government 
At the state-level the major constraint faced in the state NREGA secretariat is the lack of adequate 
number of officials to implement the various administrative duties. Most employees are contractual 
                                                     
14 Notable exceptions include Raabe et al., (2010) who conduct an analysis of NREGA implementation using case studies in Bihar 
and Aiyar and Samji (2009) who study the role the state government of Andhra Pradesh in the implementation of NREGA. 
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data-entry staff with high turnaround rates. The administration was also unaware of its role in 
appointing district level officials like the Employment Guarantee Assistant (Gram Rozgar 
Sahayak) and the Program Officer (PO). We were told that these officials were determined at the 
district level and the state authority does not interfere with local decisions.  
State level NREGA operations in UP do not have any programs to increase awareness of NREGA 
provisions among beneficiaries. Not only is this in violation of the responsibilities of the state 
government, but also contributes to the lack of information about participant rights and 
entitlements that we found in our field study. Further, under the NREGA Act state governments 
are expected to engage professional agencies for technical support to improve the quality of data 
collected under the program. This aspect of the scheme is also neglected. This disjoint between 
the ‘perceived’ and ‘practiced’ responsibility of the state government was also witnessed in the 
case of social audits. NREGA Act requires state governments to establish competent agencies to 
conduct social audits of NREGA functioning and asset creation. However, state-level officials 
contested this claim and stated that financial audits are conducted by the Central government and 
local bodies like the Panchayats decide to inspect public works completed under NREGA. 
Finally, officials were reluctant to answer any questions. Most officials maintained that there was 
no delay in releasing funds from the State Employment Fund (SEF) to districts or the submission 
of district-wise utilization certificates to the Central government. In fact, any instance of 
insufficient or delayed fund transfer was blamed on delays in data entry. While there was general 
acknowledgement of the fact that funds were inadequate to pay workers on time, officials were 
not willing to explain these deficiencies.15 Therefore, the state level administrative set-up in UP 
does not adequately fulfil its obligations under the NREGA Act, reflecting poor implementation 
of the program at the state level. We next turn to district level implementation.  
3.2 Role of the District Level Officials 
The Chief Development Officer (CDO) is the main district level officer responsible for smooth 
functioning of NREGA. Through our meetings with the CDO and his staff, we found the CDO 
conducted bi-weekly meetings with all BDOs to tackle the bottlenecks associated with NREGA. 
Further, the CDO had a team of around five contractual staff dedicated to data entry and 
                                                     
15 Public officials may be wary of pointing to the role of the state government in delaying or mismanagement of NREGA finances. 
However, our study could not ascertain these issues in detail. 
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maintaining records. However, on inspecting the records, we found that the lists of projects and 
information about works completed were not updated for the past six months. Further, according 
to the records maintained by the CDO, all workers under NREGA were paid full wages on time. 
However, when we cross-checked these entries with the workers, we found that official records 
about the number of days worked and wages paid differed considerably from those reported by the 
workers. The data entry staff at the CDO's office showed us that his records match those supplied 
by the block level officials but there was no provision for workers to verify their records. In 
addition, contrary to the provisions of the Act the CDO does not inspect or monitor the public 
works completed under NREGA which is under the purview of the Block Development Officer 
(BDO). We next turn to block level implementation.  
3.3 Role of the Block Level Officials 
Successful implementation of NREGA depends critically on block level officers discharging their 
duties in a transparent manner. However, it was at this level that we found that procedures were 
most opaque and diverged from the rules considerably. For instance, there was no Program Officer 
(PO) to oversee the implementation of NREGA. The PO is the main authority who accepts 
applications for NREGA work, scrutinizes proposals and creates NREGA employment. In the 
absence of the PO, NREGA provision and transparency mechanisms within the Act are diluted. 
For instance, there are no direct employment requests made to block level officials and monitoring 
of NREGA works is seldom undertaken. When asked about social audits, we were told that there 
was never a request for these audits from the Gram Panchayats. Further, NREGA muster rolls were 
created by contractual data entry staff and suffered from delays due to electricity shortage and 
computer malfunctions. 
The BDO himself primarily works out of another district and seldom visits the block. Therefore, 
information about NREGA responsibilities was limited in the Halia block administration office. 
We were told that the office simply compiles the lists of number of workdays generated under 
NREGA based on the information provided by the Pradhan. However, the officials at the BDO's 
office denied any corruption and leakages in NREGA funds transfer claiming that all payments 
were directly made by the state-government into the bank or post-office accounts of NREGA 
workers.  
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Further, we were told citizens have never approached the BDO for any NREGA related issue. 
Correspondingly, the officials at the BDO's office believed that NREGA was working well in their 
block in comparison to the neighbouring block. Given the lack of demands for accountability, it is 
not surprising that the provision of NREGA in the block is well below the national average and 
suffers from wage delays and other shortcomings. We next discuss implementation of NREGA at 
the Gram Panchayat level. 
 
4. STAGE-WISE FUNCTIONING OF NREGA 
This section breaks down NREGA participation into different stages to discuss potential 
challenges to its successful implementation. We discuss five main stages: (1) application for public 
employment under NREGA, (2) provision of public employment and wage payment, (3) 
supporting facilities at work sites, (4) asset creation under NREGA, and (5) presence of an efficient 
grievance redressal mechanism. 
4.1 Applying for NREGA works 
In order to ensure that the demand driven nature of the program is maintained, the application for 
NREGA employment involves two steps. First, households who anticipate working under NREGA 
must register with the Gram Panchayat (GP) which issues a job card to all applicants with a five-
year validity (Dreze, Dey, and Khera, 2006). Second, any household with a valid job-card can 
request NREGA employment by submitting an oral or written application to either the Gram 
Panchayat or the NREGA program officer. We discuss these two steps in detail below. 
Step 1: Job Cards 
Our survey revealed that close to 90 percent of the respondents had NREGA job cards issued by 
the GP. Most respondents (close to 95 percent) claimed that the Pradhan helped them in getting a 
job-card. Panel A of Table 4 shows that there is little inter-caste variation in the proportion of 
households with a valid job card. However, this percentage is significantly lower for Muslim 
households (76 percent).  
While most households had a valid job card, none of the job cards had any entry of the work done 
in the last six-months. In addition, in four villages (around 30 percent) of the sample, the job cards 
for the entire village were kept with the Pradhan’s and not the individual households. When we 
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asked the respondents to show us the job-cards, in most cases they could retrieve them from the 
Pradhan's house. In these cases, the respondents stated that job cards were always kept with the 
Pradhan and they had never questioned this practice. 
Step 2: Requesting NREGA Employment 
Around 70 percent households in our sample had never placed a formal request (oral or written) 
for NREGA employment either to the BDO or the Pradhan. Some people had informally asked 
the Pradhan for NREGA work but received no acknowledgement for this request. Most 
respondents were unaware of their role in demanding employment under NREGA. It was believed 
that NREGA works would begin only when the Pradhan desires. In fact, over 50 percent of the 
respondents believed that NREGA works are undertaken in the village because the Pradhan 
wanted to help them during the lean season of agriculture. This demonstrates that in practice, the 
promise of demand driven employment guarantee is diluted as workers are unaware of the legal 
provisions of the Act. This also explains why official records of NREGA works in the region do 
not show any unfulfilled work demand during any time.16 Since people do not request the provision 
of public employment, there is no mechanism to record how much work people want under 
NREGA. Existing research suggests there is a wide gap between the demand and actual provision 
of NREGA in regions where NREGA is not functioning properly (Dutta et al., (2014); Misra 
(2019)). However, our findings suggest that this gap may be even higher as there is no procedure 
to record the actual demand for NREGA employment by the beneficiaries. When we asked our 
respondents how many days in a year would they like to work under NREGA, the majority 
answered that they would like to work under NREGA for as much as possible. Surprisingly, 60 
percent of the respondents were unaware of their legal entitlement of 100 days of NREGA 
employment per household.  
                                                     
16 According to the data processing staff at the office of the Central Development Officer (CDO) there is no unfulfilled demand 
for NREGA is the district. According to the NREGA website, there are a few cases of unfulfilled work demand from the previous 
years. We were told that this is a actually a data entry problem and does not signify any unmet work demand under NREGA. 
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4.2 Provision of NREGA employment and Wage Payment 
4.2.1 Provision of NREGA employment 
The next step after the issuance of job cards and putting in a request for public employment is the 
provision of public employment. Results from our survey show that both, participation rates 
(extensive margin) and number of days worked (intensive margin) are low in our sample.  
Participation rate of marginalized communities 
Female participation in NREGA at 18 percent in UP is among the worst in the country as the 
national average in 2012 was around 47 percent (Mann and Pande, 2012).  Our study shows that 
only 12 percent of the women worked under NREGA. This is particularly alarming since 33 
percent of public employment created under the scheme is reserved for women.17 Our findings are 
consistent with existing studies which argue that women’s participation in NREGA depends on 
factors like presence of alternative employment for men (Desai, 2018). Since, our survey region is 
one of the most backward districts of the country, employment opportunities for men are few and 
correspondingly, they predominantly work under NREGA in the lean season of agriculture. 
However, further research is needed to identify household-level impediments to women’s 
participation in NREGA.18    
Number of days worked by marginalized communities 
The actual provision of NREGA in the region does not correspond to demand. In 2016, workers 
reported working under NREGA for an average of 29 days. The number of days worked were 
roughly equal for men and women (29 and 28 respectively). Panel B of Table 4 shows that 
marginalized communities (SCs, STs OBCs and kols) reported working for more than 31 days in 
a year while upper castes and Muslims worked for around 25 days. Low participation by Muslims 
may be attributed to high rates of inter-seasonal migration by household members (62 percent) in 
comparison to other social groups (35 percent).  
                                                     
17 Several studies have found that NREGA has had a positive impact on female labour force participation nationally (Azam, 2011) 
and political engagement in local decision-making (Girard, 2014). Tsaneva and Balakrishnan (2018) find that in the first year of 
the program, women living in districts where NREGA was implemented were less likely to experience depression symptoms as 
the program provided them economic security and independence. 
18 Several studies like Folbre (1986) discuss intra-household decision-making where the head of the household, dictates his 
preferences over economic choices of other family members.  
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However, higher participation by marginalized communities suggests that NREGA serves as an 
income safety-net for the poorer sections of society. Several studies using national and field level 
data have concluded that NREGA is mostly availed by the poor and participation by people from 
the top consumption quintile is merely 10 percent which means that the scheme is ‘not poorly 
targeted’ (Sabhiki, 2012).19 This is borne out by other studies as well. Using field data from Andhra 
Pradesh, Karnataka, Rajasthan and Maharashtra collected in 2010, studies show that small and 
marginal farmers mainly benefited from NREGA except in distress prone districts of Anantpur 
and Yavatmal where larger farmers also participated and gained from NREGA (Kareemulla et al., 
2010). 
Differential provision of employment by socio-economic status 
While the actual provision of NREGA was low in our sample, surprisingly, we found no evidence 
of any discrimination in people's participation based on gender, religion or caste of the household. 
In addition, none of the respondents reported having paid any bribes to help secure NREGA work 
or wages. In 76 percent household’s public employment was primarily performed by men while in 
others, both men and women participated in NREGA.  
Mismatch between actual provision and reported provision 
The number of workdays reported by respondents differed significantly from the official records 
on the NREGA website. For instance, the average number of workdays according to the records 
was only 25. Our findings suggest that there is significant discrepancy in official records of 
NREGA employment. Panel B of Table 4 shows considerable inter-caste variation in the 
difference between the official record and the actual number of days that people claimed to have 
worked. For instance, the Scheduled Castes and OBC households reported having worked for an 
average of 28 and 32 days respectively. However, according to the official records they worked 
only for 21 and 24 days respectively. This implies that workdays were under-reported for 
marginalized groups. This means that some of the labour performed by these groups was not 
recorded in official statistics and correspondingly they were not paid for this labour. The trend was 
different for upper caste households who reported having worked for 25 days but official records 
indicate that they worked for 37 days. Therefore, there was significant over-reporting of workdays 
                                                     
19 This is important as concerns are raised about leakage to the non-poor (Bhagwati and Panagariya, 2014). 
 18 
 
in this case. This implies that upper caste workers got paid more than what they worked while 
poorer lower caste workers who depend more on income support provided by NREGA. This shows 
that even though workers in the region do not face any discrimination in work allocation, but caste 
plays a role in determining the earnings of NREGA workers. In contrast, evidence from Rajasthan 
shows that when the provision of NREGA falls short of its demand, employment is rationed based 
on the caste and of the village head Sarpanch (Mukhopadhyay et al., 2015). This discrepancy in 
payment received by different social groups highlights corruption as an important factor in the 
provision of NREGA employment. Existing literature has reported similar findings. For instance, 
Adhikari and Bhatia (2010) report that corruption in the form of fudging of muster rolls, flawed 
work measurement, non-payment of minimum wages and delays in wage payments is widespread 
across the country. 
We found no evidence of year-long agricultural labour contracts which would hinder worker's 
ability to participate in NREGA. For over 81 percent of households engaged in self-farming or 
wage employment, NREGA employment augmented their income time without causing any 
significant substitution of private or self-employment by NREGA. This is contrary to Imbert and 
Papp (2015) who find significant crowding-out of private wage employment post-NREGA. The 
insufficient and unpredictable nature of NREGA provision does not allow farmers to change their 
labour supply decisions in response to public employment. Further, since NREGA employment 
occurs in the lean season of agriculture, labour demand in agricultural markets and in self-farming 
is low.20 Further, most employers are flexible and adjust their own labour demand to allow workers 
to participate in NREGA.21 
Perceptions about NREGA provision 
When we tried to ascertain people's perceptions about NREGA supply, an overwhelming majority 
agreed that the provision of employment under NREGA is insufficient. However, there was little 
awareness about its causes. Around 60 percent of the respondents claimed that the Pradhan “tries 
his best” to create NREGA employment but has no budget to do so. Most people said that the 
provision of NREGA has remained consistently low ever since its inception. Therefore, our 
                                                     
20 Most respondents claimed that they would prefer NREGA to remain operational throughout the year including the peak season 
of agriculture. This shows that labour demand in the rural economy (agricultural and non-agricultural) is insufficient to provide 
employment to workers at any point during the year. 
21 In most cases, private employers (agricultural and non-agricultural) adjusted the timing of their labour demand by a few days to 
accommodate NREGA employment. 
 19 
 
findings suggest that NREGA has not altered the social relations of production within the rural 
economy. This is primarily because the actual provision of NREGA does not vary by demand but 
is fixed exogenously by the Pradhan. The number of workdays created under NREGA is not 
sufficient to meet the consumption requirements of poor households in the region. The average of 
29 days of NREGA in the region in this study is lower than other regions including the worst 
performing states. For instance, during the period between 2013 and 2016, at the national level, 
NREGA generated 45 days of work in a year for each participating household in rural India. 
4.2.2 Payment of Wages 
Similar to the provision of NREGA employment, the nature of wage payment also diverged 
considerably from the norm. Our study found that there is no set schedule for NREGA payment in 
the survey villages. Officially, payment for NREGA works must be made weekly or fortnightly 
(Dreze et al., 2006). The primary purpose of employment guarantee is to raise people's incomes 
during the lean season of agriculture. Therefore, delays in payment effectively dilute the welfare 
effects of NREGA (Basu and Sen, 2015). Around 84 percent of the respondents claimed that 
NREGA payments were delayed by over two-weeks which is a direct violation of NREGA 
provisions.22,23,24  Existing research identifies delays in payments as a major impediment to the 
successful implementation of NREGA across the country. Problems of delayed wage payments 
are effectively diluting the welfare effects of NREGA (Basu and Sen, 2015). Payment delays have 
increased since 2008 with the movement from cash payments to payments through bank and post 
office accounts and the complex procedures needed to approve payments for NREGA workers 
(Ravallion et al., 2015). 
Mode of payment 
Over 92 percent of the respondents claimed to have bank or post-office accounts and produced 
bank passbooks to show NREGA payments. In the remaining cases, the money was paid in cash 
by the Pradhan. In some cases, respondents had given signed blank bank-withdrawal slips linked 
                                                     
22 The provision of NREGA remained low in Jharkhand even during acute agricultural crisis when it was most needed. 
23 This is different from the experience in Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, and Odisha where work is allocated to groups of workers and 
wages are paid to the group leader so individual workers receive less than their official wage (Banerjee and Saha, 2010). Further, 
several instances of collusion between local elected body and bank officials to reduce payments received by workers. 
24 Studies from the neighbouring state of Bihar found even longer delays. For instance, in Bihar, 38 percent of payments are delayed 
by more than 60 days (Ravallion et al., 2015). 
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to their accounts to the Pradhan who would withdraw the money and pay cash to workers.25 In 
around 39 percent of cases no wages were paid to workers even when they participated in NREGA.  
Differences in wage payments by socio-economic status 
Panel C of Table 4 shows that based on the number of days respondents claimed to have actually 
worked, the average daily wage rate paid for NREGA employment was 65 INR (0.9 USD).26 The 
actual wage rate differed considerably between social groups. For instance, on the one hand the 
upper castes and Muslim households received an actual wage rate of 86 and 73 INR respectively. 
On the other hand, the actual wage rate for SCs (including kols) and OBCs was only 63 and 69 
INR respectively. The lowest wage rate was recorded for the STs who earned less than 60 INR a 
day under NREGA. However, if we compare daily wage rates based on the number of days 
officially reported on the NREGA website, we find that the average wage rate was 78 INR and 
there was relatively little variation between wage rates between social groups.27 
We were not able to discern any differences in wages paid to men and women workers. This is 
particularly important since prior to NREGA, daily wages received by women were lower than the 
legal minimum wage in most states in comparison to men (Basu, 2013) Using nationally 
representative data (Zimmerman, 2012) has shown that female wages have risen considerably after 
NREGA. Moreover Desai, Vashishtha, and Joshi (2015) finds that around 45 percent of women 
working under NREGA during 20011 - 2012 were either not working earlier or were working 
exclusively on family farms in 2004-2005. Therefore, NREGA gave several women their first 
opportunity to earn a cash wage and consequently their material living, and household bargaining 
position have significantly improved. 
Perceptions about wage payments 
Surprisingly, more than 88 percent of the households were aware that the minimum wage in the 
district was around 100 INR per day but were not aware that the minimum wage laws applied to 
NREGA employment. Further, most respondents felt they were paid a fair amount since their 
neighbours and friends received similar wages. While most respondents remembered the dates and 
                                                     
25 In principle bank-withdrawal slips can be used only by the account holder to withdraw money but according to the respondents, 
the Pradhan can operate their bank accounts without them being present. 
26 Using the 2017 exchange rate 1 USD = 69 INR. 
27 Some respondents claimed that the Pradhan assured them that they will get another payment related to NREGA in the coming 
weeks. However, the CDO's office confirmed that all NREGA wages for the year were paid. 
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amounts of NREGA earnings, they could not calculate their wage rates and estimate whether their 
earnings were commensurate with the number of days worked. Lack of awareness coupled with 
lack of education may explain people's inability to determine whether they are paid fair wages. For 
instance, the household head in 69 percent of the households was illiterate. This number was much 
lower for upper castes (39 percent). 
4.3 Supporting Facilities at Work Sites 
According to Dreze et al., (2006), NREGA worksites are required to be located within 5 kilometres 
of the village and should have provision for safe drinking water, shade for children and periods of 
rest, first-aid box with adequate material for emergency treatment for minor injuries and other 
health hazards connected with the work [Schedule II, Para 23]. All respondents agreed that 
NREGA works were undertaken very close to the village (in most cases less than one kilometre). 
However, most respondents agreed that apart from the provision of drinking water, no other facility 
was provided at the worksite.  
Panel D of Table 4 shows that most workers agreed that in their experience no health or childcare 
facilities are provided at NREGA work sites. In some cases, women workers suggested that they 
had to delegate child-care to other family members and would benefit if there was any form of 
child-care support while they worked. However, they had never made a formal or informal request 
for this as they did not think it was mandatory under the Act. Further, most women agreed that 
their primary concern was lack of adequate work and timely payment under NREGA and 
consequently, they would refrain from demanding work-site child-care facilities as that might 
upset the Pradhan. This potentially creates impediments to women's participation in NREGA as 
they disproportionately bear childcare responsibilities within the household. 
4.4 Assets Created under NREGA 
In eight out of twelve villages the respondents claimed to have worked under two NREGA works. 
The construction of a water reservoir (talaab) and a mud (katchcha) road. Both existed and were 
verified by our team. In the remaining four villages workers only worked on a water reservoir 
which could not be completed as works had been halted owning to insufficient funds. Over 70 
percent respondents claimed that the water reservoirs helped with agricultural production but 
claimed that they have been working on the same reservoir for several seasons as it needs frequent 
repairs. More than 80 percent of the respondents had no knowledge of any list of prospective works 
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maintained by the Gram Panchayat. Finally, most workers did not know that NREGA works were 
meant to improve the productivity of their agriculture. It was believed that the government chose 
which public assets were to be created under NREGA and local participants had no say in the 
process. 
While productive assets created under NREGA can create non-transfer welfare gains for the local 
economy as they increase the productivity of agriculture (Abreu et al., 2014). However, the 
experience of this region shows that this element of the program is not implemented seriously. 
Creation of durable assets is also a significant source of corruption in NREGA. For instance, public 
employment to create wells was undertaken in Jharkhand and corruption and bribery were rampant 
during the construction process (Bhagat, 2012). Lack of accountability through social audits and 
public disclosure of payment rolls hinders the ability of workers to examine fund utilization 
certificates prepared by the officials (Ambasta et al., 2008). However, better implementation of 
the program can help in minimizing corruption and increasing transparency in NREGA. For 
instance, creating correct incentives for officials reduces theft by around 64 percent (Niehaus and 
Sukhtankar, 2013). Better implementation of NREGA can increase private market wages by 
around 6 percent and decrease days without work by 7 percent (Murlidharan et al., 2016). 
4.5 Grievance Redressal 
Over 90 percent of the respondents claimed that they had problems with the inadequate provision 
of NREGA and delayed wage payments. However, in most cases they would only discuss this with 
the Pradhan who would blame lack of budgetary allocation for the poor provision of NREGA. 
None of the respondents claimed to have approached the BDO, NREGA PO, or any bureaucrat to 
discuss problems related to NREGA implementation. This is consistent across social groups as 
seen from Panel E of Table 4. In fact, nobody claimed raising this issue in the Gram Sabha or the 
village assembly. This shows that people's perception of NREGA differs considerably from its 
actual provisions. People have not realized that NREGA is a demand driven program and they are 
entitled to 100 days of employment at the minimum wage. Most people claimed that they had no 
knowledge about the provisions of NREGA and relied on the Pradhan's interpretation of the rules 
and procedures to help them with their problems. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
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5. NREGA’S IMPACT ON AGRICULTURE 
It is important to investigate whether the creation of productivity enhancing assets under NREGA 
has had an impact on agriculture in this region for three reasons. First, as mentioned above, this 
region is traditionally characterized by the incidence of tied-labour and among the most backward 
districts of the country.28 Correspondingly, it is important to study whether NREGA has been 
successful in helping prevent indebtedness by raising the productivity and incomes in agriculture.29 
Second, raising agricultural productivity through public works is an important non-transfer benefit 
of NREGA which augments the direct income transfer under the program (Deininger and Liu, 
2013). However, creation of productivity enhancing assets under NREGA requires a coordinated 
push from the farmers, Gram Sabhas and the block level officials. As mentioned above, we found 
no evidence of any planning or proposals for possible works under the program and there was no 
mechanism for involving local farmers in deciding the nature of public assets created.  
Finally, most NREGA beneficiaries in our sample were wage workers for most months in a year. 
Existing research shows that the guarantee of alternative employment increases the bargaining 
position of workers and exert an upward pressure on rural wages (Imbert and Papp, 2015; Basu et 
al., 2009). Studies using national level data show that NREGA has allowed rural households to 
increase consumption expenditure between 6.5 and 10 percent with around 12 percent increase for 
marginalized caste groups (Bose, 2017).  
5.1 Agricultural Profile of the Region 
Table 5 provides an overview of the proportion of agricultural cultivators and wage workers by 
social group. Around 74 percent of our respondents were engaged in some form of agricultural 
production. Among these, 46 percent own the land they cultivate and the remaining 54 percent 
work as sharecroppers on the land of large landlords. While we did not find any incidence of 
                                                     
28 The Backwardness Index comprises of agricultural productivity per worker, agricultural wages, and the proportion of SCs and 
STs in the population (Planning Commission, 2015).  
29 Other studies have shown that NREGA employment enables peasants to withstand adverse weather shocks and the agricultural 
lean season when private labour demand is low (Bardhan, 1980). For instance, in 2008, around two-thirds of NREGA workers in 
North India avoided hunger and around 75 percent respondents credited NREGA for helping them sustain their livelihoods in the 
dry season of agriculture (Khera and Nayak, 2009). This, in turn may reduce their reliance on informal credit to meet their 
consumption or investment needs and reduces migration to urban areas. Studies have also shown that NREGA increased the 
consumption expenditure of the most vulnerable sections (Schedule Castes and Scheduled Tribes) during the lean season of 
agriculture (Klonner and Oldiges, 2014) 
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bonded labour in over 390 kol households that we surveyed, around 65 percent kol households 
engaged in share-cropping (adhiya) where the landlord claimed about half the total produce. The 
incidence of sharecropping among the kols was the highest among all social groups. As already 
noted, sharecropping on land owned by the landlord (who also provides credit and inputs for 
production) is an important component of tied-labour arrangements in this region. However, none 
of our respondents reported that they were forced to work for their landlords exclusively.30 
Most households cultivate small plots of land (less than 0.5 acre) and over 97 percent of the 
respondents produced solely to meet their subsistence needs. They relied predominantly on 
household labour and over 90 percent never hired any additional workers. The remaining 26 
percent of the respondents work as landless labour in agriculture and non-agricultural wage 
employment. Even among cultivators, household members engage in wage labour for six to nine 
months in a year. The agricultural produce for these households lasts between three to six months 
depending on the farm and family size. Members from most households that engage in self-farming 
also work as agricultural wage workers as incomes from agriculture are not sufficient to meet their 
subsistence needs. While 67 percent of all cultivators (and 60 percent of kol cultivators) reported 
taking a loan from the landlords or local money lenders, none of them reported any work 
conditionality attached to the loan repayment schedule. Interest rates charged were between 15 - 
25 percent per month and none of the respondents had ever approached a bank or any formal 
lending institution for credit. None of the respondents felt that banks would lend them any money 
even when all of them had bank accounts and even ATM debit cards. Most loans were taken to 
buy inputs for agriculture (67 percent), financing household consumption and medical expenses 
came next (15 percent). 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
5.2 Role of NREGA on Agricultural Productivity and Wages 
Several studies have shown that NREGA positively impacts agricultural productivity (Berg et al., 
2012) and raises agricultural wages (Berg et al., 2018). However, results from our sample suggest 
                                                     
30 The landlord occasionally asks sharecroppers to work in his house during weddings and other ceremonies without any monetary 
payment. In the focus group discussions, we found that this practice was not practices across castes and was not confined to the 
kols. People in the region distinctly remember that kols were forced to work on the landlord's farms for 1kg rice and a bottle of 
local liquor but reported that this practice does not exist anymore. While we did not any incidence of debt-bondage in our sample, 
future research is needed to determine whether the practice is actually extinct from the region. 
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that NREGA had little impact on the intensity of inputs like fertilizer, machinery and labour 
demand in this region. This is not surprising since we found little evidence of durable assets being 
created under NREGA. Further, contrary to evidence from other states; none of the NREGA works 
in this region were conducted in the fields belonging to marginalized communities. This is 
particularly important as kol farmers were granted landownership of rocky and semi-barren land 
on the outskirts of several villages under the Uttar Pradesh Land Ceiling Act of 1972.31 Under 
Category II of the permissible works under NREGA, public employment can be used to undertake 
individual works to improve the land belonging to scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, de-notified 
tribes and other families below the poverty line (Dreze et al., 2006). In contrast, Rawaware et al., 
(2015) finds that in Maharashtra around 75 percent of NREGA works on private land belonged to 
small (53 percent) and marginal farmers (22 percent) However, our study found that no such works 
were ever undertaken in the rocky fields belonging to the kol farmers who could have benefited 
immensely from such productivity enhancing works on their land. 
We also investigate the impact of NREGA on agricultural wages. Our respondents claimed that 
NREGA had no impact on their wage bargaining position vis-a-vis private agricultural employers. 
In a few instances when workers had demanded higher wages, landlords simply refused and in the 
absence of other alternative employment, workers had no choice but to accept the wages offered 
by the landlords. This was also true during the lean season of the year when NREGA employment 
was primarily undertaken. The ability of NREGA to increase wages depends on the increase in 
wage bargaining power of workers that the guarantee of NREGA employment provides. In places 
where this guarantee is diluted by the inadequate and erratic nature of NREGA provision, the 
programme would not affect wages in the countryside (Misra, 2019). Further, owing to stagnant 
agricultural productivity there was no increase in labour demand during the harvest season and 
consequently there was no upward pressure on agricultural wages. In several instances, workers 
reported having worked at wages below the legal minimum. 
Therefore, contrary to the experience of better performing states like Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan 
and Tamil Nadu where NREGA has had a positive impact on rural wages and crowded-out private 
employment (Dreze and Khera, 2009; Imbert and Papp, 2015), in the most backward regions of 
                                                     
31 Under the Land Ceiling Act of 1972, the maximum land size for agricultural holding was fixed at 12.5 acres. Any landholding 
above this size was confiscated by the state and redistributed among the landless workers, primarily belonging to the marginalized 
social groups. However, there has been limited real redistribution under the scheme and most land transferred is barren or non-
agricultural land. See Singh and Mehrotra (2014) for a full discussion on land reforms in UP. 
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the country, the full potential of NREGA has not been realized. In fact, its implementation does 
not allow cultivators to increase the productivity of their agriculture or workers to improve their 
wage bargaining potential. It simply serves as an erratic and unpredictable source of income for a 
few days in the year. Almost all respondents claimed that NREGA earnings were spent in 
household consumption and was not enough to increase their savings or provide for agricultural 
investment. Next, we discuss how lack of transparency and citizen's participation in the provision 
of NREGA is leading to elite capture and corruption in its implementation. 
 
6. LACK OF AWARENESS AND THE LOCAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
6.1 Role of the Pradhan 
The Pradhan plays a pivotal role in NREGA provision, wage payment and record collection in 
every gram panchayat. In most cases, people approach the Pradhan with most of their NREGA 
related queries. However, when we questioned people on whether the Pradhan’s discharge their 
duties as mandated by the NREGA Act, we found that the Pradhan did not keep any records of 
existing works, number of days of employment created and wages paid in a transparent manner. 
Further, NREGA job-cards were never updated with particulars of the number of days worked and 
wages paid. In several cases the Pradhan kept the job cards, so people had no idea of the wages 
they were actually paid and the number of days of work that got registered in the official records. 
This increased the opaqueness in the functioning of NREGA.  
Paradoxically, as outlined in Section 4 above, almost all respondents had a positive view of the 
role played by the Pradhan in helping them with NREGA related difficulties. Table 6 shows that 
most respondents thought that inadequate provision of NREGA and delays in wage payments were 
minimized because of the efforts of the Pradhan. It was believed that the Pradhan even pays the 
panchayat mitra an additional monthly payment of 5000 INR for maintaining NREGA records for 
the entire village.32 In addition, our respondents never met or interacted with any of the government 
functionaries like the Program Officer or saw the BDO inspect any work site. Even in Halia village 
which is located within a few kilometres from the Block headquarters, 80 percent of the 
                                                     
32 Panchayat mitras are local officials who assist with the day to day functioning of the Gram Panchayat.  
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respondents agreed that they had never heard of the Program Officer and less than 6 percent of the 
respondents said they ever spoke to any one from the BDO's office. 
This central position of the Pradhan is primarily because of a total lack of awareness of the 
provisions of NREGA among the beneficiaries. In the absence of any transparency measures like 
social audits, this concentration of political and social power with the Pradhan has led to client-
patron exchanges and corruption in the functioning of NREGA. Table 6 shows that around 90 
percent or more respondents of all social groups believed that the provision of NREGA depends 
solely on the Pradhan who has consolidated his position considerably in the local economy. 
Respondents explained that if they have to approach the Pradhan with their NREGA related 
complaints, they could not afford to antagonize him in any way. We find that in this region, the 
village Pradhan not just controls all facets linked to NREGA implementation in his Gram 
Panchayat but has also emerged as the link between citizens and government officials. A 
respondent in Maheshpur village summed up the role of the Pradhan as follows. 
“Pradhanji is surely on our side, he runs around for our work and does not ask us for anything. If 
the government doesn’t release funds, how can we blame him? He even withdraws our money and 
delivers it it us from the bank” 
Experiences from Jharkhand where local body elections have not been held since 1978 also show 
that local institutions like the Gram Sabha lacks the administrative capacity to implement NREGA 
(Bhatia and Dreze, 2006). The absence of village assemblies seriously dilutes the legal entitlement 
of NREGA as these assemblies are pivotal in ensuring that NREGA is implemented when people 
demand employment from the state. In most cases, this lack of administrative capacity is also 
reflected in the delay in appointment of officials at the village and block level.33 In fact, these 
deficiencies in public personnel and institutional capacity allows public officials to restrict the 
number of job cards and regulate the supply of NREGA workdays. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
                                                     
33 Officials at the local level include panchayat sevaks or panchayat mitras and gram rozgar sevaks and block level officials include 
supervisors, engineers etc. 
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6.2 Patron-Client Exchanges NREGA Implementation 
According to Scott (1972) patron-client relationships consist of exchanges between an individual 
of higher socio-economic status (patron) who uses his own influence and resources to provide 
protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates 
by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron. Such 
repeated exchanges between an identifiable agent within a community is a form of rent seeking in 
developing countries. The patron spends a part of the rents created in one period to provide 
protection and access to scarce resources to clients in their networks to maintain their influence 
and authority which allows further rounds of rent-seeking (Khan and Jomo, 2000). The pivotal 
role played by the Pradhan in the functioning of NREGA in his Gram Panchayat establishes him 
as the principle patron in the repeated provision of NREGA which creates rents for the local elite. 
One of the respondents in Fuliayi summed up the Pradhan’s role in the implementation of NREGA 
as follows. 
“If he [Pradhan] would not benefit, then why will he work so hard for our welfare” 
Dutta et al., (2012) attribute the low demand and participation rates in NREGA in Bihar, Jharkhand 
and Odisha to low information and awareness. As workers are unaware of their rights under 
NREGA, they rely on the Pradhan for the provision of NREGA. The Pradhan in turn, benefits 
from lack of transparency in the functioning of NREGA to control its supply to suit the interests 
of local landholding elite and appropriate NREGA funds. At the same time, the Pradhan spends 
some resources to ensure that workers continue to trust and rely on him to address their concerns 
and grievances related to the functioning of NREGA. By excluding the role of community 
participation and decision-making through the Gram Sabhas, Pradhans not only dilute the demand 
driven provisions of NREGA, but also create opaqueness in the implementation of NREGA. This 
arrangement suits government functionaries as workers do not approach the PO or BDO with 
requests for NREGA and the official records can show that there is no unfulfilled demand for 
NREGA in their regions. Such complicity between lower-level government officials and local elite 
has been studied extensively in the Indian context. For instance, Bardhan (1998) argues that 
professionals, large landlords and capitalist form dominant coalitions in India which exclude the 
poor from political participation and economic prosperity. Existing research also finds that the 
impact of NREGA on agricultural labour markets is muted in regions where high levels of land 
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inequality have persisted historically (Misra, 2019). In these districts, the class interest of large 
landlords is adversely affected by an upward pressure on agricultural wages exerted by the 
guarantee of NREGA employment. Consequently, the elite like the Pradhan control the provision 
of NREGA to ensure that it does not emerge as a credible alternative to private agricultural 
employment. 
6.3 Corruption in NREGA Implementation 
If NREGA employment is provided for 100 days in a year and wages are paid on time, the wage 
bill of large landlords would rise. In most cases the Pradhan or his extended family members are 
major employers of agricultural labour. Therefore, it is in their interest to curtail the supply of 
NREGA. Further, ignorance of official procedures creates avenues for corruption and fund 
embezzlement. Our surveys revealed that the number of days worked by individuals recorded on 
the NREGA website differed significantly from the number of days workers claimed to have 
worked. As we were conducting our study shortly after NREGA works ended for the year and 
since most workers worked on similar projects, it was easy to calculate the number of days that 
each member of the household worked under NREGA. On average, around 42 percent of our 
respondents reported working more days under NREGA than what was officially recorded, and 
the remaining workers had worked fewer number of days. This discrepancy also existed in their 
wages paid, as payments are released based on the official number of days worked by people. 
Therefore, workers whose workdays were underreported in the official statistics, were paid less 
and others were paid more for the same number of days worked.  
As outlined previously, the Pradhan maintained control of payment schedules and in some cases, 
he was also in possession of bank account details and withdrawal slips linked to workers accounts. 
Individual NREGA beneficiaries had no idea how much money was deposited in the account by 
the state, but only knew the cash payment received by the Pradhan. This discrepancy in NREGA 
records and opaqueness in wage payment is maintained by the Pradhan as he controls data entry 
for NREGA works at the village level. Further, several respondents believed that the Pradhan 
submits several requests to the BDO to ensure the release of NREGA funds. This is important to 
ensure that corruption rent-seeking continue through the patron-client engagements devised by the 
Pradhan. 
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7. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
By documenting the functioning of NREGA in one of the poorest regions of UP, this paper aims 
to explain why NREGA may not be performing well in eastern Uttar Pradesh. Using semi-
structured interviews and household surveys with government functionaries and NREGA 
beneficiaries we find that three main factors contribute to the poor and opaque implementation of 
NREGA in this region. These include: (1) lack of awareness of workers' entitlements, (2) poor 
administrative capacity, and (3) corruption and collusion between the bureaucracy and local level 
elected officials.  
This paper contributes to the existing literature by arguing that lack of awareness about the 
provisions of NREGA not only limits participation in public works but also serves as a basis for 
patron-client relationships to emerge between the local elites, primarily the Pradhans and NREGA 
beneficiaries. By centralizing all decision-making and NREGA record keeping practices, the 
Pradhans can engage in rent seeking through corruption and protect their class interests by keeping 
rural wages depressed. This arrangement also suits local administrators as it insulates them from 
day to day monitoring and implementation of NREGA. However, this collusion between the local 
elite and government officials effectively dilutes the demand driven nature of NREGA. Periodic 
social audits and people's participation in its implementation act as checks and balances on elected 
representatives and government officials at the local level. Our findings suggest that grassroots 
organisations like the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sansthan in Rajasthan are indispensable to ensure 
citizens’ participation in the functioning of NREGA. In the absence of such organizations, the 
provision of NREGA may be controlled by the local elite who may benefit from controlling the 
supply of public employment.  However, our study shows that these measures have not been 
introduced in eastern UP. Similarly, no durable assets have been created to augment agricultural 
productivity in the region. As consequence the spill over benefits of NREGA have not been 
realized and there is no change in agricultural productivity or labour demand. 
There are three important implications of this study. First, there is an urgent need to increase 
awareness and administrative capacity at the state and district level. These offices were severely 
understaffed and ill-equipped to handle the administrative workload of NREGA. This under-
staffing leads to sub-contracting of important data entry and verification work to part-time 
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employees at the state level and to people affiliated to the Pradhan’s at the village level. Not only 
does this dilute the transparency provisions of the Act, but it also creates avenues for corruption.  
Second, information about the provisions of NREGA is shockingly absent even after 10 years of 
its existence. There is an urgent need to fill this lacuna. In the absence of awareness of entitlements, 
the demand driven nature of the program is diluted. Therefore, public information campaigns and 
local self-help groups must be strengthened to ensure that the guarantee of public employment is 
maintained and NREGA emerges as a credible alternative to low wage and seasonal agricultural 
employment.  
Finally, there is a growing gap between the performance and impact of NREGA between states 
and regions. Therefore, there is a need to understand the role of local political economy factors 
that condition and complicate the functioning of NREGA. The role of local elite and their collusion 
with government officials effectively exclude NREGA beneficiaries from participating in the 
planning process and maintaining an oversight of funds transfer, works completed and 
employment generated. Further research is needed to identify the impediments faced by citizens 
in organizing and participating village level discussions on various aspects of NREGA which can 
create accountability in its provision. 
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Figure 1: Mirzpur, Uttar Pradesh
(a) Uttar Pradesh
(b) Mirzapur
Table 1: Socio-Economic Characteristics of the Sample
Variable Sample Mirzapur Uttar Pradesh
(1) (2) (3)
Percent Scheduled Castes 38 28 23
Percent Scheduled Tribes 5 0.9 0.7
Rural Literacy Rates 32 67 65
Scheduled Castes Literacy Rate 35 56 60
Scheduled Tribes Literacy Rate 39 57 54
Percent Cultivators 31 23 36
Percent Agricultural Labour 46 42 36
Population 973 2 million 155 million
Note: This table shows population percentages of socio-economic indicators of our sample, the district of Mirzapur
and the state of Uttar Pradesh in columns (1), (2) and (3) respectively. The values for the sample characteristics
are calculated using survey data which comprises of a random sample of NREGA workers in 2016. The district and
state-level measures are taken from the Census of India, 2011. All state and district level statistics are reported for
rural sectors of the economy including the total population estimates.
Table 2: Distribution of social groups by Gram Panchayats in the sample
Name of the Village Scheduled Castes Scheduled Tribes Other Backward Tribes Muslims Kols Upper Caste Hindus Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Babura Bhairodayal 21 0 5 0 14 0 40
Babura Kala 5 2 10 0 11 0 28
Babura Raghunath 13 0 0 6 11 0 30
Badauha 4 3 0 0 24 0 31
Banawa 81 0 17 1 0 2 101
Deohut 13 6 0 2 40 0 61
Fuliyari 60 20 38 0 126 13 257
Gaurva 8 2 5 2 105 2 124
Halia 45 4 0 4 25 0 78
Khutha 48 9 0 0 5 0 62
Maheshpur 63 3 25 16 0 1 108
Parshiyakala 10 0 8 3 32 0 53
Total 371 49 108 34 393 18 973
Note: This table shows the distribution of our sample across the twelve Gram Panchayats of Halia block of Mirzapur.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics: Household Characteristics
Variable Scheduled Castes Scheduled Tribes Other Backward Tribes Muslims Kols Upper Caste Hindus
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average Household
Size
5.40 6.04 5.62 5.94 5.65 5.67
Average Age 44.75 44.94 44.45 45.06 44.61 40.05
Women-headed House-
holds
0.33 0.26 0.35 0.18 0.41 0.44
Illiterate 0.65 0.62 0.73 0.74 0.73 0.39
Below Poverty Line 0.64 0.59 0.66 0.50 0.57 0.78
Ration Card 0.94 0.92 0.85 0.94 0.90 0.94
Katcha Floor 0.98 0.99 0.98 1.00 0.99 1.00
Solar Energy 0.80 0.86 0.81 0.91 0.88 0.94
Water from open wells 0.89 0.93 0.93 0.97 0.92 1.00
Toilet 0.15 0.06 0.07 0.18 0.07 0.17
Bicycles 0.82 0.69 0.81 0.88 0.77 1.00
Mobile Phone 0.47 0.39 0.41 0.35 0.48 0.56
Farm animals (mostly
goats)
2.05 2.00 2.16 2.38 2.00 2.44
Migration 0.33 0.45 0.50 0.62 0.31 0.55
Number of House-
holds
371 49 108 34 393 18
Note: This table presents socio-economic characteristics of surveyed households by social group. Av-
erage household size refers to the number of individuals living in a separate dwelling and average
age refers to the age of the household head. Literacy status is reported for the head of the house-
hold. For all other indicators, the table reports the proportion of households headed by women
or own a certain asset like bicycle or mobile phone. Farm animals reports the average num-
ber of animals owned by the household and migration refers to the proportion of households from
which at least one member lives and works outside the village for more than six months in a year.
Table 4: NREGA Participation by our Respondents
Variable Scheduled Castes Scheduled Tribes Other Backward Tribes Muslims kols Upper Caste Hindus
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Applying for
NREGA works
NREGA Job-Cards present 0.91 0.92 0.94 0.76 0.90 0.94
Households never requested
NREGA employment
0.80 0.88 0.79 0.56 0.83 0.94
Households involved in
NREGA planning
0.22 0.12 0.23 0.29 0.24 0.22
Panel B. Provision of
NREGA employment
Participation by Women 0.12 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.12 0.06
No of NREGA workdays (Re-
spondents)
27.81 31.00 31.81 25.18 30.66 25.00
No of NREGA workdays (Of-
ficial)
20.62 20.67 24.18 18.35 29.65 36.39
— Provision of 100 days of
NREGA
0.07 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.17
Payment without Work 0.03 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.06
Panel C. Payment of Wages
Bank or Post Office Account 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.91 0.92 0.89
Reported Legal Minimum
Wage
97.22 99.86 104.08 110.62 95.26 102.33
Average daily wage received
under NREGA
63.06 59.37 68.93 63.45 70.89 86.08
Delay of two weeks or more 0.72 0.80 0.63 0.50 0.72 0.89
Panel D. Supporting Facili-
ties at work site
Absence of Health-care facil-
ities
0.97 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.98 1.00
Absence of Childcare Facili-
ties
0.93 0.98 0.96 0.97 0.94 1.00
Panel E. Grievance Redressal
and Impact of NREGA
Approached solely Pradhan
with problems
0.93 1.00 0.95 0.88 0.94 0.89
No impact of NREGA on
overall welfare
0.95 0.96 0.95 1.00 0.95 0.94
No impact of NREGA on
savings
0.10 0.18 0.07 0.06 0.15 0.17
Should NREGA continue 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 1
Number of Households 371 49 108 34 393 18
Note: This table summarizes the different aspects of NREGA participation by the respondents. The
responses are based on participant’s awareness, perceptions and experience in working with NREGA.
Average number of work days and average daily wages (in nominal terms) are based on actual
work done and payments received by our respondents. All other variables are proportions of house-
holds who report not having applied for NREGA employment or receiving payment without work
etc. These replies are based on workers’ past experiences with NREGA planning and implementation.
Table 5: Agricultural Profile of Survey Respondents
Variable Scheduled Castes Scheduled Tribes Other Backward Tribes Muslims Kols Upper Caste Hindus
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Self-Farming 0.71 0.65 0.83 0.56 0.76 0.83
Share-cropping 0.33 0.37 0.40 0.15 0.65 0.10
Agricultural Labour 0.46 0.53 0.56 0.53 0.43 0.39
Non Agricultural Labour 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.15 0.07 0.17
Small landholding size 0.61 0.55 0.67 0.94 0.47 0.33
Medium landholding size 0.34 0.33 0.27 0.06 0.48 0.61
Large landholding size 0.05 0.12 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.06
Farming for sale 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.015 0.11
Number of Households 371 49 108 34 393 18
Note: This table shows the agricultural profile of the surveyed households by social group.
Self-farming, share-cropping, agricultural and non-agricultural labour are measured as proportions
of survey respondents with household members engaging in these occupations. Small landhold-
ing refers to a farm-size of less than one acre, medium land holding size is greater than one
acre but less than four acres and a land holding is characterized as large if it is greater than
four acres. The values in the table report the proportion of households owing small, medium
or large landholding by social category and whether they produce for the sale in markets.
Table 6: Role of the Pradhan in NREGA Implementation
Variable Scheduled Castes Scheduled Tribes Other Backward Tribes Muslims Kols Upper Caste Hindus
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
NREGA ever discussed in
Gram Panchayat
0.11 0.22 0.02 0.00 0.15 0.11
Ever Approached BDO 0.22 0.35 0.13 0.09 0.24 0.39
Ever Approached PO 0.11 0.22 0.02 0.00 0.13 0.11
Pradhan solves NREGA
issues
0.93 1.00 0.95 0.88 0.94 0.89
Pradhan solely responsible
for NREGA
0.89 0.96 0.89 0.79 0.92 0.94
NREGA has consolidated
the position of Pradhan
0.92 0.88 0.94 0.97 0.89 0.83
Number of Households 371 49 108 34 393 18
Note: This table shows the experience of NREGA beneficiaries in our survey and presents their
perceptions about the role of the Pradhan in the functioning of NREGA. The values in the ta-
ble are the proportions of households who have approached the village assembly (Gram Sabha),
Block Development Officer or Programme Officer with any NREGA related issue. The last
two rows of the table report the proportion of our respondents who agree with the claim that
the Pradhan is solely responsible for implementing NREGA and that the socio-economic posi-
tion of the Pradhan has improved because of the central role played by them in its provision.
